UIC Law Review
Volume 26

Issue 3

Article 6

Spring 1993

Harmonization Enforcement: The Reality Behind the Panacea, 26
J. Marshall L. Rev. 593 (1993)
W. David Westergard

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
W. David Westergard, Harmonization Enforcement: The Reality Behind the Panacea, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev.
593 (1993)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

HARMONIZATION ENFORCEMENT: THE
REALITY BEHIND THE PANACEA
W. DAVID WESTERGARD*
INTRODUCTION

Patent harmonization has as its grand design the creation of
uniform standards to govern the international procurement and enforcement of patents.1 The Draft Treaty attempts to circumscribe
all of the substantive provisions necessary to achieve this objective
in one civil law construct.
Most of the literature discussing the advisability of the United
States entering into a harmonization treaty is overly enthusiastic on
the subject.2 Published reports herald the benefits achieved by harmonization, but refuse to acknowledge potential pitfalls and harm
to the interests of the United States.3 For example, the Advisory
Commission on Patent Law Reform, in proposing changes to United
* W. David Westergard received both a B.S. in Civil Engineering in 1985
and a J.D. in 1988 from Brigham Young University. Mr. Westergard is a past
Editor of the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law (1987-88) and is
a past Law Clerk to Honorable Randall R. Rader, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 1990-91. Currently, Mr. Westergard is an associate with
the law firm of Arnold, White & Durkee in Houston, Texas.
1. Drqft Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention for the Protection of
Industrial Property as Far as Patents Are Concerned ("Patent Law Treaty'),
WIPO, Preamble, Doc. PLT/DC/3 (Dec. 21, 1990) [hereinafter PLT], reprinted
in Records of the DiplomaticConference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention as Faras Patents are Concerned, WIPO, Diplomatic Conference, pt. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Records]. All citations to the Treaty
refer to the Draft reprinted in the Records of the Diplomatic Conference.
2. See generally William T. Fryer, PatentLaw Harmonization: The Current Situationand AlternativesAvailable (pts. 1 & 2), 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 242 (1990). If the object to be achieved by United States' ratification
of the Treaty was to benefit United States inventors in foreign markets, perhaps the enthusiasm for the Treaty is justified. However, the fundamental underpinnings of the United States patent system are to promote the progress of
the useful arts in the United States. Establishing correct priorities suggests
caution before entering into a system where we provide tremendous advantages
to foreign nationals in the United States and obtain little benefit to United
States nationals in foreign markets. Perhaps harmonization, on balance, is good
for the United States. However, if existing patent law provides greater benefits
to the United States than does harmonization, we stand to lose, on balance.

3. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 15 (1975).
[H]armonization has to be viewed realistically. The trend toward viewing
'harmonization' as a good thing no matter what the problems are, as an end
in itself, is subject to a fair degree of qualification. In certain areas it may
be simply undesirable or impractical from a country's national point of
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States patent law which would bring United States law into conformity with provisions in the Treaty, argues that "everybody else
is doing it."'4 This rush to conform forces a less than thorough evaluation of the Treaty's intended objectives and also leaves doubt as
to whether the existing provisions adequately accomplish those
objectives.
On the one hand, the Treaty attempts far more than is required
simply to facilitate procurement of an international patent.5 On the
other hand, the Treaty attempts far too little, while appearing comprehensive, for effective international enforcement of patents.
While the Treaty goes a long way to establish uniform standards to
govern resolution of substantive patent issues in enforcement proceedings, its goals are not realized. The complete lack of uniform
discovery, evidentiary or procedural standards renders illusory the
benefits derived from the uniform substantive provisions.
This Article compares and contrasts proposals for the international harmonization of patent enforcement provisions with existing standards in the United States. Based on this comparison,
this Article attempts to evaluate the impact of a harmonized enforcement law on existing patent law precedent. Should the United
States enter into a treaty which forces it to give up much of the
considered precedent which has guided existing and developing
view, since the concessions that would have to be made to achieve agreement may not be worth it.
Id.
4. See THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM: A REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 11 (1992) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMISSION
REPORT]. The Commission states that "other countries appear unwilling to
change their [patent] systems absent acceptance of first-to-file by the United
States" as the justification for abandoning the highly beneficial first-to-invent
United States system. Id. The Commission's awareness that "many countries
have adopted or intend to adopt" a 20 year patent term is reason enough for the
United States also to adopt a 20 year term. Id. at 12. Finally, the Commission
presupposes that simply because, "[e]arly publication of applications is common
to nearly every other country in the world," the United States ought to abandon
its long-held practice of maintaining secret all applications until such time as
they issue into patents. Id. See also, Edward G. Fiorito, The WIPO Harmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 2 (1991) ("[T]he proposed Treaty would result in
the abolition of the first-to-invent system, which is regarded by a number of
practitioners as the 'Holy Cow' which cannot be sacrificed, although the United
States is the last country where this system has survived in its present
form.") (emphasis added).
This type of superficial analysis displays a myopic view of the United
States' objective in the entire harmonization debate. Of course, if our goal is
simply to complete a treaty, we must concede on several fronts. However, the
better question is whether we should enter into a treaty at all.
5. The European Patent Convention ("EPC"), arising from the Convention on the Grant of European Patents taking effect in October 1977, provides a
workable model for the procurement of international patents. CONVENTION ON
THE.GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS (EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION) done at
Munich on Oct. 5, 1973, reprintedin 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 5503 (1974).
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United States patent law since the first patent act of 1793?6
Finally, this Article suggests that, prior to adopting the Treaty,
the United States should seek provisions harmonizing evidentiary
and procedural standards that will govern infringement suits in the
international arena.7 Without such uniform procedural guidelines,
the same substantive standard on patent enforcement may yield
dramatically different results depending on the forum having
jurisdiction.
I.

A.
1.

IMPACT OF HARMONIZED ENFORCEMENT LAW ON
UNITED STATES PRACTICE

Present United States Patent Enforcement Provisions

Infringement: Literal or by Equivalents

Sections 271 and 272 of chapter 28 of the United States Patent
Act, establish the substantive standards that govern infringement
of a United States patent.8 Under the statute, "whoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefore infringes the
patent."9 The statute does not explain how to determine whether a
defendant has misappropriated the patented invention. However, a
rich history of case law reveals that infringement can be found in
one of two ways: literal infringement or infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.
Literal infringement occurs when a person appropriates every
element of at least one claim of a patent. This requires a two-step
analysis: first, interpretation of the claims (a legal determination);
and second, assessment of whether the properly interpreted claims
cover the accused device (a factual determination).1 0 Claims are
interpreted in light of the specification, prosecution history, other
claims and expert testimony. Once interpreted, the fact finder de6, Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318.
7. Art. 2(3) of the Paris Convention reserves to member states the right to
enact provisions of law "relating to judicial and administrative procedure and to
jurisdiction .... Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
WIPO, Doc. 274(E) (1992) [hereinafter ParisConvention], reprintedin INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (Marshall A. Leaffer ed.,
1990).
8. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 272 (1988).
9. Id. § 271(a). Section 271 also provides for infringement liability for persons who actively induce infringement, id. § 271(b), and for contributory infringers, id. § 271(c). In addition, section 271 sets out other ramifications of
infringement.
10. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding summary judgment on the interpretation of the
claim after de novo review);

ROBERT

L.

CIRCUIT § 6.2, at 159 n.11 (2d ed. 1991).
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termines whether the claims cover the accused device; i.e., whether
the accused device incorporates each element of the claim.
An accused device that does not meet each claim literally, may
still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
achieve substantially the same result.'1 A significant body of law
has been developed on what constitutes infringement by
12
equivalents.
2. Damages-Not Less Than a Reasonable Royalty

The United States Patent Act assures the patentee a minimum
level of damages. The patentee's damages must be "adequate to
compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court."' 3 Therefore, a
reasonable royalty is a minimum which establishes a damages floor.
The inventor can obtain damages from the infringer regardless
of the infringer's culpability or pre-infringement awareness of the
patent. However, United States law limits the extent to which the
patentee can recover damages. If the patent owner fails to provide
some indication on the patented article that the article is protected
by a United States patent ("mark" the patented article), "no damages shall be recovered.., in any action for infringement, except on
proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recov11. See generally Linda Susswein, The Patent Law Equivalency Doctrine
and Reduced Instruction Set Computing Technology: If It Computes Like a
Duck, Is It Still a Duck?, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 571 (1990); William E. Plyer, Elemental Equivalence: Interpreting "Substantially the Same
Way" Under Pennwalt After Corning Glass, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 546 (1989).
12. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)
(holding that substitution of silicates in a welding flux is an infringement by
equivalents); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Philadelphia Cervical Collar Co., 962
F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that no infringement occurs when a competitor's sales representatives use trademark where there is no showing of confusion about the source); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (holding that luggage clamp that grasped hanger shanks did not violate patent of clamp that grasped hanger hooks); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that no infringement by equivalents can occur if the asserted range of equivalents of the claim
limitations would ensnare prior art); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that an equivalent must be
found for every limitation somewhere in the accused device, but not necessarily
in the corresponding component); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833
F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that infringment requires that the substantial
equivalent of each element be found in the accused device).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
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ered only for infringement occurring after such notice.' 14
On the other hand, if the patent owner does mark the patented
article, the infringer is charged with notice of the patent. This constructive notice of the patent opens the door to damages. Under
these circumstances, the infringer's actual ignorance of the patent
will not limit the patent owner's right to damages.
Additionally, United States law also allows a court to award
damages for infringement "up to three times the amount found or
assessed."' 15 Courts have not increased damages under this provision except in cases of willful infringement. Increased damages act
16
to deter willful infringement and to punish the willful infringer.
3. Challenges to Validity in Patent Litigation
United States law presently allows an accused infringer to challenge the validity of the patent-in-suit as a defense to the infringement accusations. The infringer can base these challenges on the
patentee's failure to comply with any of the statutory requirements
for obtaining a patent. For example, an accused infringer will often
attempt to avoid infringement liability by proving that the patent is
invalid for reasons of novelty or obviousness.
Novelty implicates the patent law requirement that the patented subject matter be new. 17 A patent fails the novelty test if the
subject matter was known or used in this country before the date of
invention, or if the subject matter was in public use or on sale in
this country more than one year before the filing date.18 A patent is
14. Id. § 287. Section 287 also provides that filing the infringement suit constitutes notice of infringement. Section 286 of the Patent Act imposes a time
limitation on damages recovery: "[N]o recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or
counterclaim for infringement in the action." Id. § 286.
15. Id. § 284.
16. See Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (finding that one of the purposes of the Patent Act is to deter willful
patent infringement). To support a finding of willful infringement, the fact
finder must determine that the accused "infringer had no reasonable basis for
believing it had a right to do the acts in question." HARMON, supra note 10,
§ 12.4(b), at 436 (citing Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d
1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). "The test is whether, under all the circumstances,
'a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that
the courts might hold the patent invalid' or not infringed." Id. (citing Central
Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Section 102 imposes on patent law the requirement that patented subject matter be new in the United States. Id. While
"publications outside the United States also qualify as anticipating disclosures
[this is based on the] assumption of the larger availability of such information to
United States nationals, rather than any focus on the worldwide nature of the
advance sought to be patented." R. Carl Moy, Essay: Patent Harmonization,
Protectionism,and Legislation,74 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 777, 784 n.23
(1992).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b).
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invalid as obvious if the patented subject matter would have been
ordinary
obvious at the time the invention was made to one having
19
skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.
Further, section 112 of the Patent Act also provides other defenses to infringement. Proof of the patentee's failure adequately
to describe the invention, to enable the practice of the invention, or
to set forth the best mode of practicing the invention will invalidate
the patent during litigation. 20 Therefore, the accused infringer has
several courses of action to defend against the inventor's claim.
B. Enforcement Provisions in the Treaty

The Harmonization Treaty does not contain provisions directly
related to enforcement. Rather, the Treaty simply defines the
rights granted by a patent, including the patent owner's rights vis a
vis third parties. Under the Treaty, the first true inventor to file an
application for patent is entitled to the patent. 21 The Treaty adopts
23
22
requirements of utility, absolute novelty, and non-obviousness.

Having obtained a patent, the Treaty provides the right to prevent third parties from making the patented product or from offering the product for sale. In the case of a patented process, the
patent owner can prevent third parties from using the process or
from offering for sale a product made by the process. 24 The threat
of monetary damages and injunctive relief provide the muscle to
secure these rights to the patent owner.
19. Id. § 103.
20. The Commission on Patent Law Reform recommends eliminating the
defenses of best mode under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the "on sale" bar under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 100. According to the Commission, these requirements are "never considered during [the]
examination of the patent." Id. In addition, "failure to meet these requirements
does not necessarily lead to some objective harm to the public." Id. Compliance
with the best mode requirement is difficult to assess in the ex parte examination
of the patent, is very subjective, and is fraught with potential for abuse. Id.
21. PLT, supra note 1, art. 9 (holding that when two or more inventors
make the same invention, the patent is given to the inventor who first files a
patent application). This assumes, of course, that other requirements of patentability are satisfied.
22. "An invention shall be considered novel if it does not form part of the
prior art." PLT, supra note 1, art. 11(2). Prior art includes everything which
has been made available to the public anywhere in the world, before the filing/priority date. Id, This provision differs significantly from the United States
definition of novelty under section 102 of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 102. See
supra note 17 for a discussion of United States novelty requirements.
23. An invention involves an inventive step (is not obvious) if "it would not
have been obvious to a person skilled in the art at the [filing/priority] date... of
the application claiming the invention." PLT, supra note 1, art. 11(3).
24. Id. art. 19. Subparagraph (3) of Article 19 provides certain exceptions to
the rights granted in paragraphs (1) and (2). Id. The author's discussion of enforcement provisions in the preceding text and footnotes assumes the existence
of rights conferred by subparagraphs (1) and (2).
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Inkfringement and Claim Interpretation

A fundamental proposition of patent enforcement is that a patent's claims define the invention. 25 Thus, whether a product or process infringes the patent claims largely depends upon how a court

interprets the claims. Article 21 of the Treaty acknowledges the
26
It
fundamental proposition that the claims define the invention.
goes on to provide guidelines for claim interpretation that are consistent with United States law.
Specifically, under Article 21, the court interprets the claims in
light of the description and drawings. The claims
shall not be interpreted as being confined to their strict literal wording. Neither shall the claims be considered as mere guidelines allowing
that the protection conferred by the patent extends to what, from a
consideration of the description and drawings by a person
skilled in the
27
art, the owner has contemplated, but has not claimed.

Article 21(2) of the Treaty also codifies the United States doctrine of equivalents 28 by stating that claims shall be broad enough
to cover not only the express elements set out in the claim, but also
any equivalents to those elements. 29 An element is equivalent if, at
the time of the infringement, it "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way and produces substantially
the same result as the [claimed] element ....,"30 The Treaty, however, proposes an alternative definition of equivalents: An element
can be equivalent if it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that
the same result can be achieved by the equivalent element. 31 Pre25. See, e.g., Leeds v. Commissioner, 955 F.2d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (asserting that "[platent claims define the invention for the purpose of applying
the conditions of patentability"); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (asserting that "[t]he claims of a
patent define the invention").
26. PLT, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
27. Id. art. 21(1)(b). This explanation of claim interpretation, while expressed in loose terminology, is basically consistent with United States case law
where claims are interpreted in light of the specification and prosecution history, and the principle that the patentee is his own lexicographer. See supra
notes 25-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of claim interpretation.
However, United States law allows other aids to claim interpretation, such as
expert testimony. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, No. 92-1168, 1993 WL 63006, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1993) (asserting
that "[c]laim interpretation involves a review of the specification, the prosecution history, the claims ...and, if necessary, other extrinsic evidence, such as
expert testimony").
28. For a general discussion of the Treaty's application of the doctrine of
equivalents, see Heinz Bardehle, Equivalents and InternationalPatent Law
Harmonization,20 AIPLA Q. J. 119 (1992); Dr. Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO
PatentHarmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (1991).
29. PLT, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
30. Id. art. 21 (2)(b).
31. The Treaty contains no provisions on the types of permissible claims,
such as means plus function claims contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). How-
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sumably, the codification of the doctrine of equivalents will eliminate the two-tiered approach to infringement utilized by United
States courts in favor of a literal infringement analysis where
32
claims literally include their equivalent elements.
2. Enforcement of Rights
Under Article 23 of the Treaty, the patent owner can seek an
injunction, damages, or both against any person who infringes the
patent. The right, under the Treaty, to restrain the manufacture or
sale of a product (or the use of a patent process or sale of a product
made by the process) is substantially the same as the United States
right under 35 U.S.C. section 283 to prevent the violation of any
right secured by a patent. 33 However, the patent owner's right to
damages under the Treaty may differ significantly from the damages provided under United States law.
a.

Damages Under the Treaty

Under Article 23 of the Treaty, the owner of the patent "shall
have at least the right (ii) to obtain damages, adequate under the
circumstances, from any person who, without . .. [his] authorization, performed any of the acts [proscribed by Article 19]." 34 This
provision changes United States law in two significant respects.
As noted above, in the United States, a "reasonable royalty"
provides a floor for patent damages.3 5 This floor adequately rewards individual initiative without imposing on the patent owner
ever, analyzing the scope of means plus function claims under Article 21 will
likely result in the same interpretation as analyzing the scope of such claims
under section 112 of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
32. In London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991), the Federal Circuit cautioned that resort to the doctrine of equivalents
should not be automatic in every infringement case. Rather, the court suggested that the doctrine of equivalents should be reserved to combat culpable
piracy. Id. at 1538. If the Federal Circuit intends sharply to reduce application
of the doctrine of equivalents, someone must inform United States participants
involved in the WIPO negotiations. In any event, the United States' adoption of
the Treaty will nullify the Federal Circuit's unjustified attempt to limit the
scope of patent protection.
33. Under 35 U.S.C. § 283, a court "may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by [a]
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
34. PLT, supra note 1, art. 23.
35. In Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1988), the Federal Circuit noted the importance of achieving a "[truly]
fair and reasonable royalty." The Federal Circuit sought to avoid the perception that "blatant, blind appropriation of inventions patented by individual,
nonmanufacturing inventors is the profitable, can't-lose course .... The right
to exclude conferred by a valid patent thus deserves the same respect when that
right is in the hands of an individual as when it is in the hands of a corporation."
Id. at 1575.
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the obligation of manufacturing and marketing the claimed invention on her own behalf. It also provides a significant disincentive
for would-be infringers. Were damages limited simply to the patent
owner's lost profits, infringers could ignore with impunity a small
inventor's license solicitations or even threats of infringement litigation. 36 By not suggesting a standard by which the minimum
amount of damages is determined, Article 23 of the Treaty creates
ambiguity on the appropriate amount of recovery to which a patent
37
owner is entitled by virtue of the infringement.
The Treaty also introduces an important limitation on the
rights of the patent owner to recover damages at all. Under the
Treaty, damages are only available if the accused infringer "[was] or
should have been aware of the patent. 3 8 The Treaty, however, provides no hint as to what will qualify under the "should have been
aware" prong of Article 23(1)(ii). Unfortunately, various constructions of this provision are possible. The Treaty may be attempting
to introduce a "willfulness" limitation on the patent owner's right
to recover damages. If this is the case, the evidence required to
show entitlement to damages may be difficult to adduce, especially
if the burden of proof to show willful infringement is clear and con39
vincing as in the United States.
Logic would suggest that an infringer "should have been
aware" of the patent if patented articles of the sort the infringer
was making or selling were circulating about in the marketplace
bearing the patent number. 40 However, because the Treaty does
36. Id. at 1574.
37. Granted, even the determination of a reasonable royalty in the United
States is less than precise. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446
F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) the court considered fifteen factors as impacting the valuation of a reasonable royalty. In Fromson, the Federal Circuit noted that
"[d]etermining a fair and reasonable royalty is often .. .a difficult judicial
chore, seeming often to involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a
judge." Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1574. However, while the United States standard
may be imprecise, it is more concrete than no standard at all. With time, case
law under the Treaty would begin to provide some indication of a minimum
damages threshold, if any. However, in the interim, patentees would question
whether the monopoly granted in exchange for the disclosure of their inventions is empty.
38. PLT, supra note 1, art. 23(1)(ii). As noted supra, United States law imposes a notice requirement, but a patent owner satisfies this requirement simply by marking the patented article and, thus, giving constructive notice of the
patent.
39. Because United States law encourages building upon disclosures of published patents (designing around a patent), resort to increased damages for willful infringement should not be permitted unless the infringer's culpability is
proven by clear and convincing evidence. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
40. If this is true, then the Treaty makes no substantive change from present United States law.
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not contain a specific provision to that effect, each Contracting
Party is left to decide the effect of this "harmonized" enforcement
provision on a claimant's rights within the Contracting Party's
jurisdiction.
b. Right to Sue on Published Applications
Article 23 of the Treaty opens up new possibilities for a patentee to obtain damages from an infringer. The patent applicant has
the right to obtain "reasonable compensation" from any person who
commits the proscribed acts of Article 19 with respect to an invention claimed in a "published application."'4 ' In this instance, the
Treaty appears to require a showing of "willfulness" before damages may be recovered. Pursuant to the Treaty, the infringer must
have actual knowledge or have received written notice "that the invention that he was using was the subject matter of a published application .... "42
The determination that the accused actually infringed the application can only be made on the basis of claims that are eventually
issued in the patent. Thus, Article 23 permits Contracting Parties,
at their option, to preclude any suit until after the issuance of the
patent. Unless the issued claims are identical with those of the application, the narrower claims as issued govern the infringement
43
determination.
This section of the Treaty invites abuse. Under this section, the
applicant can request early publication in order to forestall potential infringement of a third party. The "infringer" may employ legitimate efforts to avoid the claims of the published application only
to find that the applicant modified the claims during the pendency
of the examination to track the "infringer's" design-around efforts.
Moreover, the "reasonable compensation" promised by subsection 2
seems to suggest a different measure of damages for infringement
of a published application than for infringement of a patent where
41. Under Article 15 of the Treaty, a Contracting Party's Office "shall publish the application as soon as possible after the expiration of 18 months from
the filing date or, where priority is claimed, the priority date." PLT, supra note
1, art. 15(1)(a). Article 15 also gives the applicant the right to request earlier

publication. Id. art. 15(2).
42. Id art. 23(2)(i), (ii).
43. This section of the Treaty suggests the United States doctrine of intervening rights. A person who makes, purchases or uses anything patented by a
reissue patent has no liability unless the thing made, purchased or used infringes a valid claim of the reissue patent which was in the original patent. 35
U.S.C. § 252 (1988). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d
1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (asserting that claims in the reissue are considered
"in the original patent" if they are without substantive change in scope).
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the measure is "damages, adequate under the circumstances."' 4 4
c.

Defenses to a Charge of Infringement

In the United States, the accused infringer can defend against
an infringement allegation on the grounds that the patent-in-suit is
45
invalid for failing to comply with a condition of patentability.
Thus, much of the United States law on obviousness, novelty or
compliance with the provisions of section 112 of the Patent Act
comes from the context of post-issuance validity determinations in
46
infringement litigation.
The Treaty contains no provisions at all relating to potential
defenses to an infringement lawsuit. However, Article 18 of the
Treaty provides for administrative revocation of a patent. 4 7 According to Article 18, "any person shall have the right to request the
competent Office to revoke the patent... [if] the conditions of novelty or inventive step are not satisfied. ' 48 Article 18 expressly excludes revocation on other grounds such as failure to comply with
formal or procedural requirements. 49 The Treaty contemplates
only novelty and non-obviousness (inventive step) as grounds for
revocation. 50
However, whether an accused infringer could seek administrative revocation during litigation is doubtful in light of the provisions
of Article 18. Subsection (1)(b) of Article 18 invites each Contracting Party to establish a fixed time period from the announcement of the patent grant, not less than six months, during which a
person may petition for revocation.5 1 This provision, together with
subsection (2) of Article 18 which prohibits pre-grant opposition,
seems to suggest that any administrative revocation would take
place early in the 20 year life of the patent. In any event, Contracting Parties who establish early dates under subsection (1)(b)
by which requests for revocation must be made will be precluded
from resorting to this procedure during litigation in the latter years
of the patent. Moreover, whether litigation could be stayed during
44. PLT, supra note 1, art. 23(1)(ii), (2). This provision of the Treaty exem-

plifies potential pitfalls associated with a less-than-comprehensive civil law
model for patent law. Professor Moy counsels caution in attempting to make
numerous fundamental changes in the United States patent system by fiat
rather than with the aid of common law traditions. See Moy, supra note 17, at

29-35.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (1988).
46. See, e.g., supra notes 10, 12, and 16 for United States cases addressing
infringement.
47. PLT, supra note 1, art. 18.
48. Id. art. 18(1)(a).
49. Id. art. 18(1)(c).
50. Id. art. 18(1)(a).

51. Id. art. 18(1)(b).
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the pendency of administrative action on the request for revocation
would presumably be up to each Contracting Party.52 Therefore,
Article 18's role as a defense to a charge of infringment under the
Treaty has its difficulties.
II.

ABSENCE OF EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS

Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent litigants in
the United States perceived advantages or disadvantages associated
with each of the different regional circuits. A patentee would seek
to file suit in a forum friendly, or at least benign, to patents. The
accused infringer would seek declaratory relief of invalidity or noninfringement in a regional circuit having a penchant for invalidating patents. Judge Henry Friendly described this race to the courthouse of choice as "mad and undignified. '53 Patent litigants
evaluated their odds in different courts notwithstanding a unified
procedural and substantive law. Not only did the perceived attitude
toward patents affect the choice of forum, but differing procedural
or evidentiary rules impacted the litigants' burden of proof or access to evidence in the different regional circuits s4
The issues involved in determining whether an invention was
invalid as obvious illustrate the dilemma well. Section 103 of the
United States Patent Code provides that an invention is obvious "if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious... to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains."5 5 In the famous case Graham
v. John Deere Co., 56 the United States Supreme Court identified
four factors necessary to an obviousness determination: the scope
and content of the prior art; the differences between the prior art
and the claims at issue; the level of ordinary skill in the art; and,
secondary considerations such as commercial success, long felt
57
needs, etc.
52. Providing Contracting Parties with options such as this, or such as the
proposed alternatives to many of the articles of the Treaty, begs disunity. A
litigant, with no right to assert invalidity after a specified time period, may not
even risk doing business with the Contracting Party if the litigant's only hope to
avoid substantial patent infringement liability is a non-infringement argument.
The obvious solution is to permit validity defenses in infringement litigation.
However, because Article 18 limits revocation to the failure to meet novelty or
inventive step requirements, patent litigants have no clear guidance on their
right to challenge validity on other grounds. PLT, supra note 1, art. 18(1)(a).
53.

HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973).

54. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989) (discussing some of the statistics revealing the frequency with which courts found patents valid and infringed).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
56. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
57. Id. at 17.
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The regional circuits, called upon to implement this standard,
did so without consistency. 5s Some treated the entire question of
obviousness as a legal question. Others found the question to be
factual, while still others found the question to be a mixed question
of law and fact. 59 Whether the question was factual or legal affected burdens on a subsequent appeal60
To ameliorate this intercircuit conflict and confusion over substantive patent law, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.61 Under this Act, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was created to "strengthen the United States patent
system" and to foster greater certainty in patent law, encouraging
'6 2
"technological growth and industrial innovation.
Notwithstanding the uniformity which the Federal Circuit has
brought to the substantive patent law, confusion continues in nonsubstantive areas. For example, sections 1295 and 1338 of Title 28 of
the United States Code give the Federal Circuit jurisdiction to hear
appeals from district courts where the district court's jurisdiction
arose in whole or in part under acts of Congress relating to patents. 63 In a straightforward patent infringement suit, this jurisdictional grant raises no questions. However, when patent questions
appear with other issues, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is not
clear.64 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has long refused to adopt its
own procedural law, deferring instead to the law of the regional cir65
cuit from which the appeal originated.
58. See Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 AIPLA Q. J. 227, 231-35
(1982) (Dean Markey, then first Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, discusses
the conflict among the circuit courts, including listing case citations on this and
other patent questions).
59. In addition, the regional circuits inconsistently ruled on other patent
law questions: Is synergism a condition of patentability?; can failure to disclose
the best mode of practicing the invention be shown without proving intent to
conceal?; under what conditions was a sale for experimental purposes?; what is
the burden of proof to establish a public use bar? See Charles W. Adams, The
Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit:More Than a NationalPatent Court,49
Mo. L. REV. 43, 57-58 (1984) (discussing conflicts in patent ownership in the
federal courts).
60. In accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
factual questions cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a). Legal questions are reviewed de novo on appeal.
61. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
62. The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 350, 358 (1982)(statement of Rep. Hon. Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338, 1295 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
64. See Dreyfuss, supra note 54, at 30-31. One recent case reveals the Federal Circuit's liberal application of its jurisdictional mandate. Additive Controls
& Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
65. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Federal Circuit will apply regional circuit law
to procedural matters that are not unique to patent issues. Id. at 1574. Profes-
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To avoid both venue disputes and a return to the "race to the
courthouse," any attempt to harmonize patent enforcement law
should consider adoption of an international patent court system
having exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under the
Treaty.66 The European Community Patent System 67 and its "Protocol on Litigation"68 provide a model for consideration.69 The
Community Patent Convention ("CPC") creates a "common system
of law" and a "unitary, autonomous and therefore supranational"
court system for the application, grant and enforcement of patents
granted for the Contracting Parties. 70 The CPC court system functions much like the federal system in the United States without regard to national boundaries.
A.

The Importance of Uniform ProceduralGuidelines

The Treaty's lack of provisions relating to jurisdiction, discovery, evidence or procedure renders consistent application of uniform substantive provisions impossible. By analogy, the United
States' attempt to create the Federal Circuit reveals the monumental task remaining even after adoption of a harmonized treaty containing substantive provisions. In the United States, the same
substantive provisions yielded different results in the various regional circuits. The creation of the Federal Circuit eliminated the
inter-circuit conflict by removing the source of the problem. The
Treaty contains no provisions for eliminating the source of future
problems such as adopting a common judicial body having jurisdiction over all patent disputes arising in any contracting state. As a
practical matter, and as a matter of national sovereignty, creating a
multi-tiered court system with one or more supranational courts
having world wide appellate jurisdiction over decisions from nasor Dreyfuss gives a detailed analysis of the "substance/procedure" dichotomy
in her article. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 54.
66. In the United States, federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of cases arising under "any Act of Congress relating to patents ....
" 28
U.S.C. § 1338 (1982 & Supp. 1992). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdic-

tion to hear appeals from any district court, if the jurisdiction of that court "was
based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title ... ." Id. §§ 1295(a)(1),
1292(c).

67. Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L

401) 1. This Agreement grew out of two earlier agreements which resulted in
the European Patent Convention (EPC) and the Community Patent Convention (CPC). Id. at 10; see 1 EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK: CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS § 32.2 (2d ed. 1992).
68. Community Patent Convention Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation

Concerning the Infringement and Validity of Community Patents 1989 O.J. (L
2985) ("Protocol on Litigation").
69. For a detailed discussion of the European Community Patent System,
see Christian Hilti, The Future European Community Patent System and Its

Effects on Non-EEC-Member-States, 18 AIPLA Q. J. 289 (1990).
70. Id. at 296.
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tional patent courts is not likely to happen. Thus, any set of rules,
regardless of how extensive, applied by national courts in each Contracting Party will not ensure a comfortable degree of uniformity.
Perhaps another solution to the United States crisis which resulted in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 would have
been the creation of a detailed civil law codification of procedural
and substantive law to govern patent disputes. Because they control access and use of evidence on which substantive law must act,
procedural, evidentiary and discovery guidelines would have been
essential to assure consistent application of the substantive standards. The Treaty tackles, at best, only one half of the complete
job-the substantive law.
1.

United States Discovery Under the FederalRules

The underlying principle of discovery in the United States is
that the parties in an adversary system are best suited to adduce the
evidence on which to apply the substantive standard in such a manner that justice prevails. The Supreme Court has recognized that
principle by acknowledging that each party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts are in his or her possession to avoid surprise at trial. 71 To that end, Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
any non-privileged
Civil Procedure permits discovery regarding
72
matter involved in the pending action.
In the United States, attorneys will pursue every single will-o'the-wisp in the vague hope that they will obtain some evidence to
help their case, or out of trepidation that inaction will activate their
malpractice insurance policy. When the only threshold to permissible discovery is the chance that the information sought might lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence, very little stands in the way
73
of broad discovery efforts.
Thus, attorneys in patent infringement suits will take depositions "till the cows come home." They take depositions of inventors, those involved in the research effort, attorneys who
prosecuted the application, competitors, and even patent examiners
to gather evidence impacting the validity of the patent. They also
take depositions of accountants, executives and marketing experts
71. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)(contending that the "cry
of 'fishing expedition' [can no longer] serve to preclude a party from inquiring

into the facts underlying his opponent's case").
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Under the Rules, discovery is not even "limited
to the merits of a case." It is merely designed to help "define and clarify the
issues" for trial. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
73. Indeed, judges of the Federal Circuit have wished for the day when "all
relevant evidence is always fully considered before a final conclusion is reached
on any issue. .. " Markey, supra note 58, at 235.
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to determine commercial success, lost profits and reasonable royalties. The list is only limited by the boundless ingenuity of lawyers.
Afterithe depositions, parties still have rights to more discov75
ery. Depositions on written questions, 74 interrogatories to parties,
production of documents, entry upon land for inspection and other
purposes, 76 and requests for admission 77 round out the United
States attorneys' arsenal to use against the opposing party. Of
course, discovery on non-parties provides another opportunity to repeat the entire procedure.
2.

Discovery in Europe

By comparison with discovery provisions in the United States,
discovery in the rest of the world seems to be "a massive conspiracy
of concealment masquerading as privacy. '7 8
For example, in
France, as in many civil law countries, many view litigation as a
private dispute between private parties. Because the dispute is private, a party should not be compelled to publicize information they
do not wish to divulge, nor should a party trouble non-parties with
79
the private affair. Litigation is not a search for absolute truth.
A short summary of discovery procedures in France reveals the
80
marked contrast between the United States and foreign systems.
The most obvious distinction between permissible discovery in the
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 31.
75. Id. 33.
76. Id. 34.
77. Id. 36.
78. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on TransnationalDiscovery, 8
J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 419, 420 (1986). In fact, many European countries
have enacted "blocking statutes" specifically to block broad based United States
discovery requests. See Diana Muse, Note, Discovery in Franceand the Hague
Convention: The Search For a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1076
n.14 (1989) (noting that some nations have deliberately passed laws to avoid
United States discovery requests).
79. Muse, supra note 78, at 1087.
80. As transnational litigation became more pervasive, the power of courts
in one country to order alien litigants to permit discovery of information in
their homeland became more debatable. The inevitable conflict between discovery procedures in common law countries and in civil law countries came to a
head in 1970, when the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters opened for signature. The Hague Convention attempts to bridge the differences between the systems by offering a compromise.
Under the Hague Convention a party has three options to obtain evidence: [s]he
can file a "Letter of Request" which is similar to letters rogatory; take evidence
through a diplomatic officer or consular agent; or request a "competent authority" of the state to appoint a person to take evidence in that state. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, arts.
1-17 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Even though the United States ratified
the Hague Convention in 1972, the Supreme Court subsequently determined
that Convention procedures were neither exclusive nor mandatory. Thus, a
United States district court properly could order foreign nationals appearing
before the court to produce documents in a foreign land, notwithstanding the
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United States and discovery in France is that the French court,
rather than the parties, controls the evidence gathering effort. 81
Many of the civil law countries do not permit the broad document
request permitted by Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, parties must identify specific documents which they
want the other side to produce.8 2 In the event documents are produced, they go directly to the court and become part of the official
record. A party does not have the option to review the document,
and then ignore it if it contains information harmful to the requesting party's interest.8 3 Moreover, if a party desires other written
discovery, attorneys must make requests to the court.
Equally antithetical to broad American discovery is German
civil procedure which provides no general right to discovery evidence. s 4 For example, in Germany, the relevancy standard is much
more strict than Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 5 A party desiring certain evidence must substantiate the
evidence by showing in advance the facts that the evidence is intended to prove. The rationale for this rule is that "no party is required to provide for his opponent's victory in court material which
the opponent did not already have at his disposal. '86 Similarly, in
France, a party must specifically identify the documents before the
opponent is required to produce them.8 7 In Germany, a "part[y]
cannot be forced to testify, and [a] court will refuse to take the testimony of any witness" where a party simply wants to learn what the
witness might "know about the facts in dispute. 8 8 Moreover, in
both Germany and France, expert witnesses are neutral third par89
ties called by the court and paid by the losing party after the trial.
In France, the right to a jury trial is reserved only for criminal
existence of a foreign blocking statute. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 544 & n.29 (1987).
81. Civil law countries view interference with their courts' evidence gathering efforts by courts and citizens of a foreign country to be a violation of their
judicial sovereignty. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852 (1st Dist. 1981) (finding that West Germany, for
instance, holds the gathering of evidence as an exclusive state court function).
82. See Muse, supra note 78, at 1075 n.8.
83. See id. at 1088.
84. See John Reitz, Essay: Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German
Advantage in Civil Procedure,75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1001 (1990) (noting the limited discovery opportunities for litigants in Germany)
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
86. Reitz, supra note 84, at 1002.
87. See generally Kent A. Lamber, The Suffocation of a Legal Heritage: A
ComparativeAnalysis of Civil Procedure in Louisiana and France-TheCorruption of Louisiana's Civilian Tradition, 67 TUL. L. REV. 231 (1992).
88. Reitz, supra note 84, at 1002.
89. Id. at 989.
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cases. 9° In Germany, no jury trial right exists at all.91 Thus, in civil
litigation, judges determine both facts and law with little distinction
between issues of fact or law, or between rules allocating burdens of
proof.9 2 Of course, in the United States, the Seventh Amendment
guarantees the patent litigant's right to a jury trial.93 In addition,
whether an issue is factual or legal impacts greatly the burdens of
proof on appeal. 94
Product liability litigation provides a good example of how different results could be obtained in civil law countries based on the
very same substantive provisions. To succeed on a claim for products liability, the plaintiff must first prove the identity of the defective product and that it originated from the defendant. The
plaintiff must then prove a causal nexus between the harm and the
defect. Manufacturing, research and development information is
essential to establishing the nexus because this information will reveal both the defect and the probability that the defect could cause
the type of harm suffered. Without third party discovery or expert
discovery, proving liability is extremely difficult. The European
plaintiff loses, not because the substantive law is any different in
Europe, but because European discovery procedures curtailed his
95
access to proof.
The Proposed Treaty has no provisions whatsoever on the form
of discovery intended to be applied in patent litigation. The Treaty
does not address rights to jury trial, issues of fact or law, avenues of
appeal, access to witnesses or documents, burdens of proof, collateral estoppel, or presumptions of validity. Presumably, each of the
Contracting Parties will resort to their respective national law and
existing procedures in the absence of specific direction in the
Treaty. However, attempts to apply a harmonized substantive standard to wildly differing procedural and evidentiary standards will
only exacerbate the existing conflict between common law and civil
law countries. 96
90. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,63
TUL. L. REV. 553, 573 (1989).

91. Reitz, supra note 84, at 986.
92. See Muse, supra note 78, at 1080 n.31 for a discussion of judges' power in
determining factual and legal issues in France.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
94. Rights of appeal and the type of review by the appellate court can
greatly impact a litigant's substantive rights. In Germany, for example, courts

of appeal are not bound by factual findings of lower tribunals. See Reitz, supra
note 84, at 989 (analyzing Germany's system of civil procedure).
95. See Muse, supra note 78, at 1074. For a discussion of these and other
differences between United States and civil law discovery systems, see generally Lowenfeld, supra note 78.
96. The ultimate goal in harmonizing patent enforcement laws would seem
to be increased efficiency in litigation to enforce patents. Blonder-Tongue Labs,

Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) permits as a defense to an
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The enforcement provisions of the Harmonization Treaty reveal the fundamental shortcoming of the entire harmonization effort-harmonized substantive provisions alone provide no real
assurances of harmonized results.
The enforcement provisions as written merely furnish a skeletal framework on which to build. While the underlying structure
may be sound, much is needed to put flesh on the bare bones. The
United States has no obligation to charge into a Harmonization
97
Treaty with the naive anticipation of a "johnny-come-lately."
Perhaps greater effort should be made to achieve a more comprehensive plan that provides uniformity, or harmonization, not only
in the substantive provisions, but also in the evidentiary, procedural, and jurisdictional provisions. Only then will the seductive
illusion of world-wide harmonization be a reality.

infringement allegation assertion of a prior determination of invalidity. Once a
United States patent has been found invalid, it is invalid for all purposes. The
patent owner does not have the option of choosing a different defendant in a
new forum in the hope of receiving better luck at the hands of a new fact finder.
The Treaty does not address the collateral estoppel effect of decisions by the
various national courts. If present practice is any indication, national courts
will be loathe to give collateral estoppel effect to a decision from a foreign court.
Must litigation occur in every Contracting Party?
97. Ratification of the Treaty by the United States will require the legislature to enact laws consistent with provisions of the Treaty. Dissatisfaction with
provisions in the Treaty are not easily remedied. Either the United States will
have to achieve an international consensus or withdraw from the Treaty. See
Moy, supra note 17, at 21.

